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RECENT CASES.
ADMIRALTY-JOINDER OF PROCESS.-THE PLAw=r VENUS ET AL, 113 Fed.
387.-Held that process in rem and in personam may be permitted to issue
upon the same libel in a proceeding brought to enforce a contract of affreight-
ment.
Courts have been slow to recognize the utility of this rule. The court
acknowledged that the practice in Pennsylvania had heretofore been otherwise
in accordance with the decision of Judge McKenna in The Alida (C.C.), 12
Fed. 343, but held that the contrary practice was clearly adapted to avoid
circuity of action. The first case to recognize the opposite practice was The
Zenobia, Fed. Cas. No. 18,208. This decision has been followed in the later
cases in many of the States. The Director, (D. C.), 26 Fed. 708, The Keokuk,
9 Wall 517.
The court restricts the rule to proceedings brought to enforce a contract
of affreightment, adding that exceptional cases may arise to which the rule can-
not be applied.
ATTORNEY'S FEE-WORTHLESS JUDGMENT-CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACT.-
LESLIE V. YORa, 3i So. W. 751 (Ky.).-In an action brought by attorneys
against a client, under a contract where client agrees to pay his attorneys
an amount equal to one-half what they may recover. Held, That they were
entitled to an amount equal to one-half the amount the client actually recov-
ered from the judgment and not one-half the judgment itself.
This decision rested entirely upon the construction to be given the word
"recover" and in deciding the court acted entirely upon the principle that it
would be unreasonable to expect in fees one-half the amount of a worthless
judgment.
BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-JUDGMENT FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION-
COLwELL V. TINKER, 7 Am. B. R. 334.-A judgment for criminal conversation
with plaintiff's wife was secured against defendant who was subsequently
discharged in bankruptcy. Held, motion to vacate judgment properly denied.
Under Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act a bankrupt is released from all
provable debts except judgments for "willful and malicious injuries to
the person or property of another." Malice need not be actual as in Burnham
v. Pidcock, 5 Am. B. R. 590, it may be implied. In re Feeche, 6 Am. B. R.
479. It is also held on principle that this was a personal injury to the hus-
band; as well as a violation of his right of property. Cregin v. Brooklyn,
ect., Ry. Co., 83 N. Y. 595. Contra, Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y.
1o7; Bigaonette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123.
BANKRUPTCY-INVOLUNTARY PETITION-SUBSEQUENT VOLUNTARY PETITION.
-IN RE DwYER, 112 Fed. 777.-Held, where a bankrupt against whom an in-
voluntary petition is pending files a voluntary petition, notice should be given
to the creditors filing the former before action on the latter. Such action
should then be taken with respect to the two petitions as is for the best inter-
ests of the estate.
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Whether under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 adjudication could be had on
a voluntary petition during the pendency of an involuntary petition was vari-
ously decided. In re Stewart, Fed. Cas. No. 13,419, held it could not. In re
Canfield, Fed. Casi No. 2380, contra. In the present case, administration under
the voluntary petition would have worked injustice by making unassailable
certain preferences by reason of the expiration of the four-months' limitation
fixed by Section 6o of the Act of 1898.
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCE-SURENDE.-IN RE GRETH, 112 Fed. 978
(Penn.)-A creditor received preferences of a bankrupt and contested his
right to a lien upon bankrupt's estate until final judgment of State Supreme
Court in favor of trustee. Subsequently creditor proved his claim before a
referee with surrender of preferences. Held, that this constituted no volun-
tary surrender within Act of 1898, Section 57, and claim should be rejected.
Authorities greatly vary as to what constitutes a surrender and how far
proceedings may go leaving the right to surrender. It has been repeatedly
held that surrender may be made at any time before final entry of judgment.
In re Riordan, 14 Nat. B. R. 332, and cases cited. Voluntary surrender is a
prerequisite to right to prove claim. It re Lee, 14 Nat. B. R. 89. Under act of
1898 the few cases which have considered the subject have left it in an unset-
tled state. In re Richards, 94 Fed. 633, and In re Owings, io9 Fed. 624, hold-
ing directly the contrary. In the principal decision the court follows the very
recent case. In re Keller, lO9 Fed. 126, against the weight of authority, but
not without support.
BANKRUPTCY-PREFERENCE-WARRANT OF ATTORNEY TO CONFESS JUDGE-
MENT-CoNsTRUCTIoN SECT. 3, CLAUSE 3, BANKRUpTCY ACT JuLy i, i898.,
WiLsoN BRos. v. NELSON, 7 Am. B. R. i, 2 Sup. Ct. 74.-A judgment was
entered and execution levied thereon upon an irrevocable warrant of attorney
to confess judgment given 1885, and the insolvent debtor failed to vacate or
discharge executor by filing a petition of bankruptcy at least five days before.
Held, this was a preference "suffered or permitted" under Sect. 3, Clause 3,
and constituted an act of bankruptcy irrespective of intent or ability to prevent.
Fuller, C. J.; Shiras, J.; Brewster, J.; Peckham, J., dissenting.
This decision reverses Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 413; Clark v. Iseliro,
21 Wall. 36o; National Bank v. Warren, 96 U. S. 539, decided under act of
i867, and also Buckingham v. McLean, 13 How. 1SO, under act of 1841, where
the issues wete the same. The interest centers upon the interpretation of Sec.
3. Clause 3: "having suffered or permitted while insolvent, any creditor to
obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having, at least five
days" before execution "vacated or discharged" same. The former acts ex-
pressly include intent to prefer. In the present case the debtor is passive.
The dissenting opinion ably shows that under the statute an act is necessary
to constitute bankruptcy, that an act and volition are in law inseparable from
each other, and that the warrant of attorney was not made in view of the pro-
visions of the Act of 1898. The State decisions show much divergence.
COMMON CARRER-ExPULSION FOR NON-PAYMENT OF FARn-UNImT RAn-
wAYS & ELEcTRic Co. v. HARDESTY, 51 Atl. 4o6 (Md.).-Plaintiff presented
detached coupon to conductor, who rang up fare and then demanded to see
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coupon book which he could not produce. Conductor did not demand cash
fare, nor did plaintiff tender such payment. Held, defendant not liable
for expulsion.
Whether cash fare must be demanded after tender of invalid ticket does
not appear from the reported cases to have been hitherto directly in issue.
Railroad Co. v. Kirby, 88 Md. 4o9; Boylan v. Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 146.
Judicial notice, however, will be taken of a passenger's obligation to pay;
Condran v. Railroad Co., 14 C. C. A. 506, 28 L. R. A. 749, and from this the
court infers that the custom of demanding fare cannot be treated as a require-
ment, but that the duty rests with the passenger to tender payment.
COMMON CARRIER-LIABILITY-STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU-NEGLEcT.--ROSEN-
THAI. ET AL. V. WEIR, 63 N. E. 65 (N. Y.)-Held, where a. common carrier
agrees to stop goods in transit and then negligently delivers them it is liable
for the full value of the goods, notwithstanding the fact that the goods were
carried under a bill of lading limiting its liability.
The exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu by the plaintiff puts an
end to the contract of carriage, and revests the possession of the goods in
him. Cross v. O'Donnell, 44 N. Y. 661, 4 Am. Rep. 721. Penn. R. R. Co. v.
Am. Oil Works, 126 Pa. 485, 17 At. Rep. 671. A common carrier from the
time it is notified and directs its agent not to deliver goods becomes the bailee
of the shipper to which relation a bill of lading has no reference. If it then
delivers goods it becomes liable in trover. Litt v. Crowley, 7 Taunt. i6g,
23 Eng. Ruling Cases 411.
COMMON CAmRIER-RIDING ON PASs-AssuMPTION OF RISK-DUNCAN V.
MAINE CENT. R. Co., 113 Fed. 508 (Me.).-Held, that one riding on free pass,
assenting that he should assume all risk and that carrier should not be liable,
cannot recover for injuries from negligence of carrier's servants.
This decision directly departs from the well-established rule that a com-
mon carrier canno, stipulate against responsibility of himself or servants,-
5 Am. & Eng. Ency., 5o8; R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall 357; Waterbury
v. R. R. Co., 17 Fed. 671. It follows the distinction laid down in the New
York and New Tersey cases, generally denied as having no solid foundation.
Whart. on Neg., 641. See also R. R. Co. v. Voight, i7iFed. 671.
COMMON CARRIE cKTIcET AS EVIDENcE-RIGHT TO SToP-OFF.-ScHoIEL
v. PENN. CO., 112 Fed. 855 (C. C. A.).-Where R. R. Co. agrees to transport
passenger between specified points with right to stop off at intermediate points,
there being nothing on face of ticket inconsistent with such right nor rule of
company contrary, and conductor takes coupon covering distance between such
points, Held that passenger may resume journey from point of stop-off without
ticket and action lies for expulsion.
There is much conflict as to the value of a ticket as conclusive evidence
of rights of passenger. Many cases hold that upon failure to exhibit ticket
passenger may be expelled upon refusal to pay fare whatever be the circum-
stances. 25 Am. & Eng. Ency., 1075-77; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 347. The
current of recent cases, however, in what would seem the better doctrine, sup-
ports this decision. Murdock v. Boston R. Co., 137 Mass. 293; Phila, etc.,
R. Co. v. Rice, 64 Md. 63.
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CCNTRAcTS-CNFLCT OF LAWS-SuRETYSHIP.-UNoN NAT. BANK V.
CHAPMAN ET AL., 62 N. E. 672 (N. Y.).-Defendant, residing in Alabama,
signed, as surety, her husband's note, which was made negoiiable in Illinois.
Defendant did not know where the note was to be negotiated. Held, that her
contract was an A-abama contract and, as such, void under its laws. Bartlett
and Vann, J. J., dissenting.
Several well considered cases are found which support the conclusion of
the New York court. Vorit v. Brown, 42 Hun. 394; Scudder v. Bank, 9I U.
S. 406. But in the leading case of Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, upon a
similar state of facts, the court held that the contract was governed by the
laws of State where negotiated. The distinction between these classes of
cases, seems to rest upon the question whether the surety was aware of the
place of negotiation. The dissenting opinion holds that the contract of sure-
tyship had no inception until the note was negotiated.
CONTRACTs-OPTIONS-RIGHT OF A STATE TO PROHIBIT CONTRACTS FOR
FUTURE DELivERY.-BOOTH V. STATE OF ILLINOIS, U. S. Sup. Ct. (Mar. 3, I902).
A statute of the State of Illinois invalidating contracts giving an option to sell
or buy at a future time any grain or other commodity, whether delivery is
contemplated or not, is not in violation of any constitutional provision.
Brewer and Peckham, Justices, dissenting.
The statute is held not repugnant to the clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, and the interpretation put on that clause in Algeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, namely, that it means the right of a citizen to pui-
sue any avocation and for that purpose to enter into all contracts necessary
and proper. If the State thinks certain evils cannot be successfully reached
unless the calling be actually prohibited the courts cannot interfere unless the
statute clearly has no real relation to that object. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S.
623; Minnesota v. Barber, 36 U. S. 313; Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62.
And following the principle that courts may not strike down an act of legisla-
tion as unconstitutional, unless it be plainly and palpably so, the decision of
the Illinois Supreme Court, Booth v. People, I86 Ills. 43 is upheld.
It is an interesting question as to how far States may go in the exercise of
the police power, in depriving the citizen of the right to make any contract not
in itself harmful or injurious to the public. The liberty to contract cannot be
restrained by arbitrary legislation resting on no reason by which it can be
defended. Shaver v. Penn., Co., 71 Fed. Rep. 93I; State v. Goodwell, 33 W.
Va. 179. There can be no question as to the legality of option contracts in
general, and they are perfectly valid and enforceable. Bigelow v. Benedict,
79 N. Y. 202; Kirkpatrick v. Bousal, 172 Pa. St. 155. But in Illinois and
other States option contracts have been invalidated and placed in the category
of gambling contracts and hence unenforceable and void. Schneider v. Tur-
ner, 130 Ill. 28; Preston v. Smith, 156 Ill. 359; Osgood v. Bander, 75 Iowa,
550; Schlee v. Guckenheitner, 179 Ill. 593. There is, however, much difference
of opinion as to the operation of these statutes, and the opinion of Justice
Harlan should go far toward putting an end to these contracts.
CONTRACTS-PRIVITY-CITIZEN AND MuNicIPAuTY.-GRAvEs COUNTY WATER
Co. v. LIGON, 31 S. W. 725 (Ky.) -City of Mayfield passed an ordinance granting
to a water company the privilege of supplying city with water, for protection
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against fire. Held, that where private property is destroyed by fire, as a result
of the negligence of the water company, an action will lie in favor of the
owner of the property, for failure of the company to perform its contract.
After accepting the benefits of the contract the company is estopped from
denying its liability under the statute of frauds for its failure to sign the con-
tract.
It is well settled that no action will lie against a city in favor of a private
owner, for city neglecting to provide a sufficient water supply. Tainter v.
Worcester, 123 Mass. 311. But in this case the court reasoned that the con-
tract was made by the city for the benefit of its citizens and as there is a
privity of contract an action may be maintained. Gorrell v. Supply Co., 124
N. C. 328; Paducah Lumber Co. v. Paducah Water Supply Co., 89 Ky. 340.
COURT-MARTIAL-REGULAR OFFicERs INCOMPETENT TO TRY VOLUNTEERS.-
DEMING V. MCCLAUGHRY, 113 Fed. 639 (C. C. A.).-A volunteer was tried and
convicted by a court-martial composed of officers of the regular army. Held,
that the volunteer force is not a part of the regular army, and that regular
officer, are incompetent to try volunteers.
* Although the general commanding the army has held that regular officers
can lawfully try volunteers, Circular 21, H. I. A., June 30, 1898, the uniforim
course of legislation, decision and practice establishes the fact that it has be-
come the policy of the United States to prohibit the trial of officers and sol-
diers of the volunteer force by the officers of the regular army. r Stat. 424;
2 Stat. 37r; Binet, Military Law, 25; 18 Stat. Iz3.
DOWER-MINERAL RIGHTS-LFE ESTATE-OIL.--HIGGINS Om & FUEL Co.
V. SNOW, 113 Fed. 433 (C. C. A.).-Defendant was entitled to dower estate in
certain land under the laws of Texas. Held, that she had the right to drill
oil wells and claim the proceeds. I
The general rule at common law is that a life tenant may work mines that
are open when the tenancy commenced but he cannot open new mines.
Stoughton v. Leigh, I Taunt. 402; Coates v. Cheever, I Cow. 460; Went,'s Ap-
peal, io6 Pa. 3O. And some of the more modern cases go further, holding
that mining will be allowed if the owner of the preceeding estate has fixed
on it the character of mining land. Piddy v. Griffth, 150 Ills. 56o; Seager v.
McCabe, 92 Mich. 186. But the Court disregarding the common law follows
boldly the rule of the civil law, 2 Doam. Civil Law, 945-968, Bryan, Petroleum,
41, and declares that the tenant in dower has the right to seek for and open
every kind of mine and is entitled to the proceeds thereof.
ELECTIONS-QUALIFICATIONS-CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-PowELL v. SPAcK-
MAN, 65 Pac. 503 (Id.).-Held, that a soldier making his permanent residence
at a soldier's home does not thereby acquire a right to vote in the county or pre-
cinct where such institution is situated. Sullivan, J., dissenting.
The leading case, decided under New York constitutional provision
(copied by many States) witholding this right where persons are supported
by the public in charitable institutions is, Silvey v. Lindsay, lO7 N. Y. 55; fol-
lowed here and in Michigan and Kansas, but rejected in California, Oregon
and in U. S. v. Rowdebush, Fed. (Ia., not reported). There seems to be re-
luctance in applying the rule without exception, and a conflict of opinion as to
circumstances justifying exception.
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MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY FROM DANGEROUS MACHINERY-PROMISE
TO REPAIR-ASSUMPTION OF RISK.-RICE V. EUREKA PAPER CO., 75 N. Y. Sup.
49.-Plaintiff worked on a defective rag-cutter. He knew the danger but was
induced to remain at work by defendant's promise to repair. He was injured
before the expiration of the specified time. A divided court held, plaintiff
assumed the risk.
The assumption of risk in employment is contractual in nature. By prom-
ising to repair defective machinery does master create a new contract by which
he assumes risk? The majority feeling constrained to follow N. Y. decisions
decide in the negative. McCarthy v. Washburn, 42 App. Div. 252; Marsh v.
Chickering, IOI N. Y. 396. The minority answer affirmatively in agreement
with Cooley on Torts, 559-6o, the U. S. Supreme Court, and decisions of other
states. Hough v. Ry. Co., 100 U. S. 213; Ferriss v. Machine Works, 9o Wis.
541.
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF LESSOR-McCABE'S ADmx. v. M. & B. S. R. Co.,
66 S. W. 1054 (Ky.).-By authority of the legislature M. & B. S. R. R. had
been leased to C. & 0. R. R. Owing to negligence of lessee in opefrating one
of its trains over the leased line intestate was killed. In suit brought by ad-
ministratrix to recover damages lessor and lessee were joined as defendants.
It was argued by detendants that lessee was alone responsible. Held, that
the lessor was liable for the torts of the lessee.
The tort here was not caused by any defect in instruction, but solely
by the negligence of lessee. It is not settled whether the lessor is responsible
for the torts of the lessee, but the best cases seem to hold as in the main case.
R. R. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 450; Balsley v. R. R. Co., rig Ill. 68; Southern R.
R. v. Bouknight, 7o Fed. Rep. 442; Nelson v. R. R., 26 Vt. 717. Some very
carefully considered cases, however, take the opposite view. St. L. W. & W.
R. R. v. Curl, 28 Kans. 622; Ditchett v. R. R., 67 N. Y. 425; Langley v. R. R.,
IO Gray io3.
NEGLIGENCE-RAILROAD CARRYING MAIL.-GERMAN STATE BANK V. MINNE-
APOLIS, ETC., RY. Co., 113 Fed. 414-Plaintiff deposited in the United States
mail a registered package, containing $3oo0 in currency. The package was
carried in a mail sack on defendant's train to its station, where through negli-
gence of the company, it was extracted from the mail sack. Held, that the
railroad company was not liable.
No legislation has ever arisen before on this subject. A railroad company
carrying the mails does not assume as to them any of the duties or responsi-
bilities of a common carrier. As to the mail itself the railroad has no duty
except what it owes to the government, its employer.
NEGLIGENCE-STREET R. R.-EPAIRS OF STREET-ADMISSIBILITY OF MUNI-
CIPAL RESOLUTION.-WELCH V. SYRACUSE RAPID T. Co., 75 N. Y. i73.-R. R.
Law, Section 98 requires street Ry. Co. to keep in permanent repair portion of
street two feet outside its tracks, under supervision of city. City Charter,
Section 3o authorizes mayor and council to regulate and repair streets. Pas-
senger on defendant's cars was injured by stepping into a hole in pavement
made by a paving company working under city authority. Held, the resolu-
tion of city council empowering company to repave street is admissable to show
whether or not defendant was negligent.
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Such resolution is competent as bearing on its negligence, even though
defendant was not relieved of duty to keep street in repair by reason of ac-
tion of city. Snell v. Ry. Co., i9 N. Y. Sup. 476. The dissenting judges argue
from Conway v. Rochester, 51 N. E. 395, that Ry. statute is mandatory and
city has no authority to relieve Ry. Co. of its duty but only to supervise.
Defendant is also negligent for stopping car opposite the hole. Wolf v. Ry.
Co., 74 N. Y. Sup. 336.
NEGLIGENCE-WALLS OF BURNED, BUILDING-CARE REQUIRED OF OwNER-
DAMAGES.-AINsWORTH v. LAKIN, 62 N. E. 746 (Mass.).-Held, where walls
of a burned building, which could not be used in rebuilding, were left standing
without any precaution being taken to prevent their falling, the owner, after
a reasonable time in which to take such steps
jury from the wall, is liable for all damages caused thereby.
Any person who for his own purpose brings on his land and collects and
keeps anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril.
Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. 3 H. L. 33o. This rule has been applied to cess-
pools, Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582; to artificial reservoirs, Gray v. Harris,
1O7 Mass. 492; to accumulation of snow and ice upon a building by reason
of the shape of its roof, Shipley v. Fifty Associates, io6 Mass. 194; and to an
ordinary wall; Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; Channtler v. Robinson, 4
Exch. 163. The only exceptions to the liability which have been judicially
recognized are in cases of the plaintiff's own fault, or acts of God, or acts of
third persons, which the owner had no reason to anticipate.
RES JUDICATA-EQUITABLE RELIEF-CoMMERCIAL UNION ASSUR. Co., LIm-
ITED, v. NEw JERSEY RUBBER CO., 51 AtI. Rep. 451 (N. J.).-Insurance company
issued policy with agreement that other concurrent insurance should be pro-
cured and so distributed that liability under said policy should be for a propor-
tionate part only of any given item of loss. After occurrence of fire loss,
such proportionate part of indemnity was tendered, policy was canceled and
unearned premium returned. Insured, having failed to procure the agreed
concurrent insurance, brought action at law on policy whieh was allowed to
proceed to judgment, this being that validity of policy had been recognized
by cancellation. Held, that such adjudication did not make liability on policy
res judicata so as to prevent court of equity from entertaining bill of relief,
for the matter in pais had different significance in court of law from that in
court of equity. Gummere, C. J., and Fort, Pitney, Adams, and Vreden-
burg, J. J., dissenting.
This decision draws a distinction between those judgments at law as to
matter which has the same significance in courts of law and of equity, and
those as to matter having different significance in the two courts. It expres-
ses a broader and more just rule'of law than the strict rule admitting no such
distinction followed in Hendrickson v. Hinckley, 58 U. S. (17 How.) 443;
Breckenridge v. Peter, Fed. Cas. No. 1,825 (4 Cranch, C. C. I5).
TRADE-NAMES-SUIT AGAINST CORPORATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT-THE
PECK BROS. & CO. V. PECK BROS. ET AL., 113 FED. REP. 291 (C. C. A.).-The
fact that a corporation has been chartered by a State under a certain name,
which it selected, does not afford it immunity from a suit in a Federal Court
RECENT CASES.
by a corporation of another State to enjoin it from prosecuting its business
under such name, where the name was deliberately and fraudulently adopted
by its incorporators in imitation of the complainant's.
The defendants relied upon the case of Hazelton Boiler Co. v. Hazelton
Tripod Boiler Co., 142 Ill. 494, in which the opposite doctrine is well stated.
In that case the Court argued that the name of the corporation was conferred
by the State as an act of sovereignty, and that a foreign corporation cannot
assert rights in contravention of its laws. The Court refuted that theory
upon the ground that the name is not conferred by the State but is chosen by
the incorporators, and that the act of sovereignty allowing incorporation is
permissive, not mandatory. This appears to be the better view since the other
would have the effect to protect a corporation from the consequences of its
own wrong. The contrary practice though established in Illinois has found
little favor in the courts of other states. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co.,
144 N. Y. 462, 43 Am. St. Rep. 769; Hohnes, Booth & Hayden v. Holmes &
Atwood Mfg. Co., 37 Conn. 278, 293, 9 Am. Rep. 324.
VERDICr-DIRECTING VERDICT.-CAMPBELL V. MANUFACTURERS' NAT.
BANK, 51 Atl. Rep. 497 (N. J.).-Held, that where bank cashier conducts his
individual transactions with bank's drafts, the regular entry on stub of draft
book of such acts is no evidence that bank's directors and president had
knowledge of and ratified such acts for no fraud could be detected short of an
investigation of bank's books and there was no error in directing verdict ac-
cordingly. Magie, Ch., and Dixon, Collins, Garretson, Vredenburgh, and
Voorhees, J. J., dissenting.
This decision appears to be a departure from the tendency of New Jersey
cases as in Railroad Co. v. Moore, 24 N. J. L. 830; Transportation Co. v. West,
33 N. J. L. 432; Railroad Co. i. Shelton, 55 N. J. L. 342. It follows, Bank of
New York Nat. Banking Ass'n v. American. Lock and Trust Co., 143 N. Y.
559, 564; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Forty-Second and G. St. Ferry Co., I39
N. Y. 146. The weight of the law seems to be against the decision, that is,
such questions should be left to the jury.
WILLS-MENTAL INCAPACITY-TEsTIMONY OF PHYSicIAN.-JoNES V. COL-
LINS ET AL., 5I Atl. 398 (Md.).-Where a physician has never attended a tes-
tator professionally, but has twice prescribed for him, held, that his opinion
as to mental capacity is admissible without first stating circumstances upon
which it is founded. Pearce, J., dissenting.
Whether mere prescription will so constitute one an attending physician
has not hitherto been decided. The dissenting opinion would seem to be
deduced from good authority in reasoning that it would not, as prescription
might be for any cause other than such as would give one an opportunity
of observing a patient's mental condition, and this ought clearly to appear.
Waters v. Waters, 35 Md. 542; Corn. v. Rich, 14 Gray 335; Hastings v. Rider,
99 Mass. 6.
